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THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC.

Translated from the German of Dr. K. ROSENKRANZ, by G. S. HALL.

Much as that which Hegel accomplished as pedagogue demands recognition; still, that which had greatest scientific significance, which he wrought out all in quiet during his rectorate, and which grew up to him partly from the ever newly formed *dictata* of which he made use in his lectures, was the elaboration of the Logic, which appeared, like the Phenomenology, at an unfavorable time, in the midst of the great war of nations in Europe.

The Logic should make only the beginning of the system of science, to which the Phenomenology had furnished an introduction in so far as it had had, as its result, from the development of consciousness, the conception of absolute knowledge. This stand-point of self-consciousness, in which the antithesis of subject and object was absolutely cancelled, was to unfold itself in the organic form of free, self-subsistent idea. Inasmuch as, in the depiction of the embryonic plan of the Hegelian system, the historical connection of his Logic with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason has been already given, we will here revert to this no further than is unavoidably necessary in order to characterize the position which Hegel's Logic assumes in science, and from which alone its form and its language can be rightly understood and judged.

The general problem transmitted from Kant to Hegel was to develop the idea of pure reason in the totality of its deter-

minations in such a manner that the understanding, which with Kant remained master of reason and prescribed for it boundaries which it must not transcend, should subordinate itself to reason as its tool. To this end it was necessary to rescue the categories from the uncritical dead form in which they had been adopted by Kant from the old formal logic. The latter had selected its distinctions only empirically. There are, according to it, ideas, judgments, syllogisms, in manifold form, just as there are negroes, Mongolians, &c., in manifold varieties. The determinations were found ready made in tradition, only always differently arranged by logicians, furnished with more or less illustrations, and in general brought into relation to more or less matter entirely foreign to themselves. Hegel now demanded that the idea of reason, as that of the logical idea, should develop itself in a connection in which every determination must be mediated as necessary, but at the same time, likewise, should mediate another. The categories could not, therefore, appear as fixed, unmoved conceptions of the understanding, but they are essentially dialectic, i.e. they pass through themselves over into other and opposite conceptions, quality into quantity, something into other, one into many, essence into appearance, ground into consequence, content into form, substantiality into causality, cause into effect, general into special, &c. It must, therefore, be shown how an idea is changed in and through its development, i.e. how it advances to the idea which is the opposite of itself, which emerges from its sublation [dissolution] as its positive result; for negation does not come from without to the idea, but it produces its negation itself from within outward. All ideas of pure reason make up, therefore, a system in which the lower is richer in extent but poorer in content, while the higher is poorer in extent and richer in content, inasmuch as the latter embraces in itself, as steps of its formation, all that have gone before it; for it is higher only in that it includes in itself all that is presupposed by it, through a determination which has power to transcend it and to sublate it into itself. The higher step not only preserves the lower in itself, but also changes them, in that it elevates them to itself.

The correctness of this problem in apprehending the deter-

minations of pure reason as dialectic, is to be granted throughout. The science of logic, which treats of the laws of thought, contradicts itself when it presents these laws in a formless shape, as an inorganic mass, as a medley of fixed ideas. Thinking—the final ground of all motion, of all life—cannot be unmoved and lifeless in itself. Of the necessity of this problem, by the solution of which Kant's Critique was emancipated from the enchantment of the understanding, Hegel was entirely conscious, and so said that he must re-form the Logic from the very beginning.

The second special problem bequeathed from Kant to Hegel lay in the solution of the old metaphysics by means of logic. Fichte and Schelling, Kant's immediate successors, had neither a logic nor a metaphysics, but, with them all, the elements of these sciences had become moments of consciousness. Hegel returned to a metaphysics within logic, by developing the categories of Kant, and by making them precede the idea of the universal. He declared the determinations, quality, quantity, relation, modality, to be definitions of Being in itself, as categories of objective logic, in distinction from idea, judgment, syllogism, as the moments of subjective logic. The metaphysics of logic should be made to consist in the fact that the latter is the ideal archetype of all reality. The idea of pure reason is the *prius* of all concrete reality, which is rational only in so far as it is thought in itself, and is, therefore, thinkable for us. The idea as logical, to speak like Kant, is the ideal prototype of nature and of mind. In the idea of reason, e.g., the pure idea of quality exists; in nature, qualities—red, yellow, sweet, sour, hard, soft, rough, smooth, heavy, light, &c.—exist. So also in mind, dull, shrewd, upright, false, strong, weak, &c. The idea of quality in itself is, therefore, that of pure quality, because in that real quality it gains existence, but itself is no definite quality. The same is true of quantity, &c.

Consequently, all those ideas must be excluded from logic which belong to nature or to mind, like the conception of life, which falls to nature; or the knowledge of the true, or the willing of the good, which fall to mind. In this Hegel is still biassed by Kant, who applied the dialectic to the ideas of soul, world, and God. The idea of the absolute idea, purely

as idea, Hegel seems not to have regarded as significant enough, and therefore he determined it further as life, and as knowledge of the true, and as willing of the good. The science of the logical idea must also, in conclusion, sublate [cancel] itself, i.e. pass over to nature; but it does not follow hence that it must itself develop the idea of life in which nature reaches itself as idea.

With respect to the idea of mind this difficulty exists, viz. that the idea of reason is unthinkable without that of mind, for reason is the totality of the abstract determinations of thinking, but thinking exists, *in actu*, only as the activity of a thinking subject; hence ordinary logic takes it up psychologically from the stand-point of knowledge, and inquires how we come to form ideas, judgments, and syllogisms. But with the determinations of thinking as such, it is found that they are independent in themselves, and are valid not only for thinking, but for all being. They are law not merely for our ideal subjectivity, but no less for all real objectivity. It is by virtue of this that they can appear as the neutral indifference of nature and mind in the autonomy and autarchy of the logical idea; in which, however, it must not be forgotten that the principle of reason, the ground of its existence, is ultimately the absolute mind itself. When Hegel said in the preface to his *Logic*, that it presents the truth as it is unveiled, he sought thus to express that the categories of reason are the absolute form, without which neither nature nor mind can be thought. It would be impossible to think the concrete — star, plant, animal, fantasy, action, family, &c. — without the abstract determination of reason; the latter are contained, therefore, in the concrete as its unity, difference, ground, &c., but in a concrete manner; for nature and mind are not merely the veil of pure reason, as though they were related only externally to it, as though they presented only a masked reason, but, compared with the abstract form of reason, they are as it were higher forms of the idea. Hegelians misunderstand Hegel when they behave as if in all philosophy only logic were ultimately concerned, of which nature and mind properly are only superfluous translations.

Still another expression of Hegel, in the same place, has led to many disputes. He said that the *Logic* could be

regarded as the exposition of God as He was before the creation, of nature, and of the finite mind. This has been received as though he had put the conception of the logical idea in the place of God. All Hegelians who are pantheists, or atheists, or Logo-theists, make the idea of God vanish in that of reason, and regard logic as the fortunate destruction of all theology. It is still not to be left out of account that Hegel himself distinguished, on the one hand, between reason and God, and, on the other, between God and the finite mind. He says, when we abstract from nature and from the finite mind, and therefore from ourselves, only the abstraction of pure thinking remains. God can then be determined only as Logos. He is, then, pure Being, absolute essence, idea in itself. He would say that philosophy concerns itself only with definitions of the absolute, and that hence those of reason are in and for themselves divine. To obviate misunderstanding, he declared later in the *Encyclopedia* that of the categories only the first and third, but not the second, could have validity as definitions of God; for only the former were affirmative, while the later, intermediate between them, was negative; e.g. quality, quantity, measure, make up the ontological trichotomy. Thus I must think of God as the essence of all qualities as well as the measure of all things, but not as quantity, because as infinite He transcends all quantitative limitations; thus I must think of Him as essence and reality, but not as phenomenon, &c. Hegel exhibits here an imperfect reserve, which was first developed into greater clearness and distinctness in his lectures on the proofs of the existence of God.

The unmistakable enthusiasm with which Hegel was wont to speak of the *Logic*, has its cause in the absolute interest of science, and of thinking in general, in the categories. Can these be fortuitous? Can there be now this, now that significance arbitrarily given to a category? Certainly not. In common life, to be sure, we carelessly use related categories promiscuously. We speak of something and thing, essence and substance, reality and actuality, ground and cause, &c., as equivalents in meaning; but in science we must undertake a critical sifting. If these most general ideas are not fortuitous but necessary, they must

hang together among themselves, and make up an accordant totality in which every determination results only from a mediation which concerns only it. The uncritical consciousness lays hold of now this, now that category, according to its needs, and operates therewith as well as it can; the scientific consciousness, on the contrary, renders account of the categories, and limits each to its appropriate sphere. We uncritically apply, e.g., the category of *thingness* to every possible object. We apply it rightly in naming, e.g., a lump of sugar, or a thimble; but if any one should name family, or state, or poetry, a thing, we should ourselves take offence in common conversational language. Hegel has, therefore, rightly apprehended the problem of the science of the logical idea, even if his solution of it may be contested in single points. It is impossible that those determinations, from the truth of which all other truth in thought depends, should not be necessary. My caprice must not decree what is to be understood by being, essence, phenomenon, content, form, &c. My caprice cannot decide which idea has to develop itself earlier, which later, in this logical cosmos. Let it be undertaken with a single idea, in order to show the truth of what has been said. Let any one undertake to say what effect is, and he is obliged to go back from it to cause. Can he rest at cause? No; cause leads to the idea of substance, which is active, and from which the change of being which we designate as effect arises. But what is substance? Substance is a reality subsisting through itself, in contrast to a merely accidental existence which definitely is only in and through another definite being. Thus, analytically, we can ever retrogress until we arrive at the general conception of Being, of pure Being without predicates, beyond or beneath which nothing more can be thought. Or, let the contrary method be followed. Let us ask ourselves—What arises from effect? Obviously, a new effect; i.e. the effect becomes itself, in turn, a cause. When an officer in a battle gives to his soldiers the command to *fire*, this word is an effect of his thinking, and considered as sound, of his vocal organs. But this effect becomes the cause of the soldiers' discharging their weapons. This effect becomes cause that, of the hostile soldiers, some are killed or wounded. This effect becomes cause

that they either energetically resist the attack, or flee, &c. There arises, therefore, an infinite progress. At the same time the idea of cause and effect is changed into that of reciprocity; action invariably follows reaction, &c. Thus thinking pursues its onward way synthetically through deduction, until here, too, it arrives at an ultimate, viz. the idea, which in the causal process of substances constitutes the principle of their activity. In the adduced example, one would proceed *in concreto* from soldiers to armies, from armies to nations, from nations to their wars, from wars to history, from history to freedom, which is the idea of mind. The process goes no farther. All the remaining categories lie midway between the idea of the being without predicates and that of the idea, which is the unity of the particular idea and its reality. Included in logic are the determinations of being, of essence, of idea, in all their differences,—still themselves the content, to the universality of which nature and history are related as examples.

Over against the fulness of the concrete idea in nature and history, the cosmos of the logical idea with its abstract categories appears in fact as a world of shadows. It is remarkable that Hegel is so often reproached with offering up the world of blooming life to idea as to a desolate Hades. Can Hegel make the abstract something other than it is? Is not, then, this abstract contained in the concrete as its logical soul, just as the shades in Hades are not absolutely dead, but are departed souls that must drink blood in order to make themselves apprehensible? Hegel himself designated the logical ideas as pure essences, souls; and so, too, they are with him as they are in reality; but what is the logic of so many logicians? Not a Hades, in which souls longing for life drift about, but a church-yard, into which the bones of the corpses of ideas are desolately and promiscuously thrown.

If Hegel sought to present the connection of the categories as in itself self-producing, he must make each one to appear analogously, as a special formation of the logical idea, the same as he did in the Phenomenology with the different stand-points of consciousness. It has been supposed that he changed categories into individualities, and reduced them to

speculative poetical figures that waver past like the shapes in Goethe's masquerade procession. In order to gain a clear conception of Hegel's process, it is only necessary to institute the attempt to make any category develop itself with perfect objectivity, and without mixing in, one's own personality. As soon as it is no longer said, e.g., we pass over now from quality to quantity, or, in another form, after we have disposed of the conception of quality, we come now to that of quantity, &c.; but when quality shall sublate [develop] itself into quantity, it will be found that quite another language will be used. It will be seen how the idea of quality changes with each progressive distinction which is made, until finally through itself it projects the determination opposed to it (that of the indifferent external boundary) on itself, and thereby passes over into the category of quantity. It is true that Hegel has constructed a new language for logic; but this was a necessity, which moreover had the advantage of being truly German, without lapsing into a fantastic purism. How far the effect of this most admirable language extends, must by no means be overlooked. We read everywhere that the Logic was composed in a very dark, oracle-like tone, which must frighten the "uninitiated" from its study; but far rather, such remarks themselves are intended to create the prejudice which frightens students from it. I will here extract a few passages at random from the Logic, and then let it be asked whether they are written plainly, whether they are German, whether they are in good taste, and how they should be written otherwise. In the doctrine of extensive and intensive *quantum*, e.g. in the elucidation of their difference, he says:

"Degree is thus determinate magnitude, quantum, but not at the same time multitude, or the Plural within itself; it is only a plurality; plurality is the plural aggregated in simple determination, extant-being gone back into being-for-self. Its determinateness must, indeed, be expressed by a number as the most perfect determinate being of quantum; but it is not a sum, but simple, only *one* degree. When we speak of 10, 20 degrees, the quantum which has so many degrees is the tenth, twentieth degree, and not the amount or sum of the same: in that case it would be extensive; but it is only *one*, the tenth, twentieth degree. It contains the determinateness

which lies in the enumeration 10, 20, but does not contain it as plural; but it is the number as sublated [cancelled] enumeration, as simple determinateness."

What is there to be changed in this?—We take the liberty of extracting from the doctrine of the idea of Actuality another passage, in which the difference between might [*Macht*] and power [*Gewalt*] is described:

"Power [external constraint] is the phenomenon of might, or it is might as external. Might is, however, external only in so far as the causal substance, in its action, i.e. in its positing of itself, is at the same time presupposing, i.e. posits itself as sublated. Hence, conversely, an act of power is none the less an act of might. It is only an Other presupposed by itself upon which the powerful cause works; its working thereon is negative relation to itself, or the manifestation of itself. The passive is independent, which is only posited; something broken within itself—a reality which is condition, and, indeed, condition in its truth, viz. a reality which is only a possibility; or, conversely, inherent being, that is, only determinateness of inherent being, only passive. It is, hence, not only possible, but necessary, for him on whom power is exerted, to exert power; whatever has power over another, has it because it is the might thereof, which thereby manifests itself and the other. Passive substance is posited by power only as that which it in truth is, especially because it is the simple Positive or immediate substance only in order to be posited. The prerogative of being a condition is the semblance of immediateness, which real causality strips off of it. Through the penetrating influence of another power, justice is thus done to passive substance. What it loses is the above immediateness, substantiality foreign to it. What it receives as foreign to it, viz. to become determined as a posited being, is its own determination."

How plainly and how strikingly all this is said! Let the experiment be made on one example to see whether Hegel's inflections must necessarily be used. The vital, e.g., is the might which exerts power upon the inorganic world; the inorganic—air, light, water, &c.—is immediately present over against the Vital; the Vital presupposes it as its condition. But in laying hold on it, it ceases to be self-subsisting in respect to the might of life, and is sublated by it. In this sublation, might manifests itself as power, which manifests at the same time itself and that which it determines as passive to it. Thus the sculptor who exerts power upon a block

of marble, in order to make a statue of it; thus the teacher who exerts power upon the intelligence of a child, in order to make therefrom a cultivated understanding, &c. In this metaphysical category morality is, of course, not involved; might may not conduct itself with injustice, as if *potestas* and *jus* were ethically the same, but only causality is involved. Ordinary consciousness receives much only from the side of activity or passivity, without bringing both determinations together in the unity of reciprocity. Men complain, e.g., that the state exerts power in taxation, or in enforcing military duty; but forget that the state is their own substance, without which they can possess no property and would enjoy no personal safety. How far a government may impose too many burdens on the citizens, &c., is another question.

Hegel's style made great progress in the *Logic*, The language of the *Phenomenology*, full of spirit, pervaded with an ironical tone, artistic in bold pictures, often highly pathetic in its descriptions, mystic in its imagery, only recurs when Hegel regards indignantly the want of confidence in the mind to recognize truth, or the frippery of formal logic, or the hypocrisy and bad preëminence of positive sciences. Otherwise he writes entirely to the point, and with pedagogical regard for his readers. Neither does he fail, at important points, to adduce the history of science, and to show how the idea of being-in-itself belongs to the Eleatics; that of becoming, to Heraclitus; that of the One, to Leucippus and Democritus; that of quantity, to Pythagoras; that of measure, of identity, of difference, and of ground, to Leibnitz; that of the Negative, to the Skeptics; that of the thing-in-itself, and of phenomenon, to Kant; that of content and form, of matter and form, to Aristotle; that of substance, to Spinoza; that of the general idea, to Plato; that of the absolute idea, to Plato, Aristotle, and Kant. His *Logic* allowed no true principle of science which had ever made an epoch in its history, to escape it. But that which appears in the history of philosophy in connection with a thousand-fold other relations, enters the *Logic* as a simple idea in its systematic place.

Where it seemed necessary to him, he made remarks and

digressions, of which that upon the idea of the differential calculus, under the category of quantitative infinity, is one of the most weighty, to which, in the second edition of the Logic, only that upon Berzelius' theory of chemical affinity, and Berthollet's critique, can be compared. He would never have resolved upon such a casual, loose form of expression in the Phenomenology; for that needed to be a plastic, definite, beautifully articulated work of art. Now clearness of understanding was his supreme aim; the æsthetic design, to form out of the Logic a scientific work of art, was not lost sight of, but it became subordinate to didactic necessity.

As pedagogue, he had learned also the art of exemplification, and knew how to make good use of it in the Logic. He had acquired the tact of remarking where and how an illustration was necessary to the reader. He speaks, for example, of the formal syllogism, and seeks to show that it can attribute to the same subject contradictory determinations because it can make of the different sides of the subject a *medius terminus*. The conclusion can accordingly be correct in form, yet false in content. This he explains by illustrations:

“When from the *medius terminus* of sensuousness the conclusion is reached that man is neither good nor bad, because neither the one nor the other can be predicated of the sensuous, this is correct; but the concluding clause is *false*, because of man as concrete the *medius terminus* of spirituality is no less valid. From the *medius terminus* of the gravity of the planets, satellites, and comets, toward the sun, it duly follows that these bodies fall into the sun; yet they do not fall into it, because they are in equal degree their own centre of gravity, or, as we say, they are impelled by centrifugal force. Also, from the *medius terminus* of the sociality, community of goods of citizens can be deduced; but from the *medius terminus* of individuality, when it is driven into like abstraction, the dissolution of the state ensues, as has been the case, e.g., with the German empire, because it has adhered to the latter *medius terminus*. There is, in short, nothing which is held to be so insufficient as such a formal conclusion, because it reposes upon chance or upon arbitrariness, which *medius terminus* is to be made use of. When such a deduction has spun off through conclusions ever so finely, and its correctness has been fully granted, still it leads at least to nothing; for the fact ever remains that other *medii termini* arise, from which the exact opposite can with equal propriety

be deduced. Kant's antinomies of reason are nothing else than that, from a conception, now one of its determinations is made fundamental, and now, with equal necessity, the other."

Hegel opposed logical formulism. It is quite erroneous to think that he despised the forms of formal logic; on the contrary, he respected them as products of mind, which, in his estimation, was higher than nature. Hence he expressly took them under his protection, and said:

"If it is thought not unimportant to have discovered more than sixty species of the parrot, and thirty-seven species of the veronica, &c., the discovery of forms of reason must be esteemed still more important. Is not a figure of logical syllogism something infinitely higher than a species of parrot, or veronica?"

Hegel has repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that no true determination of formal logic is lost in speculative logic, but that, rather, the former is dialectically reproduced in the latter. When, e.g., formal logic posits the idea of the general, special, and individual, it describes these determinations, in part psychologically, in part grammatically, until it forgets this, and suddenly treats them as in-and-for-themselves independent. It commences psychologically. It calls upon consciousness to abstract from the Manifold in immediate contemplation; thereby the unity which exists in the Manifold is attained; this identity is the generality which therefore appears as the product of an act of theoretical intelligence. The general is the idea. Now it proceeds to combining conceptions into judgments. This combination is again an act of consciousness; it is not the conceptions which combine themselves, but it is the thinking subject which brings together into a proposition those which are taken as external to one another. Thereby logic becomes grammatical. It names the judgments expressly, logical sentences, *enunciationes*, *propositiones*. It is the thinker who joins the predicate — or, more properly, any predicate — to the subject, in that he ties it to it with the copula. The copula is, in turn, regarded as a bond which is external and indifferent alike to the subject and to the predicate, although it unites both. In the syllogism, formal logic combines judgments with one

another by deriving from the relation of two judgments with each other, a third as result. Hence they can no longer affirm their subjectivity, for the dependence of the determinations upon each other, and therewith the metaphysical element of logic, come here to light. The so-called rules of inference express nothing but the independence of the idea toward the thinking subject. *Ex propositionibus mere negativis nihil sequitur. Ex propositionibus mere particularibus nihil sequitur.* But why not? In the first case, because the affirmative nature of the idea forbids it; in the second, because the special cannot be subsumed under the special, but only under the general. *Quid valet de omnibus, valet etiam de singulis;* because in the idea, generality is identical with individuality. *A majori ad minus, non a minori ad majus valet consequentia;* of course, because the individual must contain determinations which are not in the special; and the special, distinctions which are not expressly posited in the general. Logic recognizes here, therefore, that ideas determine themselves so that, when their objective relations are not attended to, the conclusion has no validity. It finds itself compelled also to distinguish the essential from the unessential characteristics; qualitative from quantitative; positive from negative; substantiality from causality; possibility from actuality; chance from necessity; i.e. the entire metaphysics breaks suddenly into logic, and is smuggled in, now here, now there, in the form of abrupt definitions. Once arrived at this point, logic falls into the opposite extreme of subjectivity with which it psychologically began. In the figures of the syllogism it began to calculate by means of ideas. Calculating is, in fact, thinking, as Bardili said in his Logic, with which he would cure 1800 as with a *medicina mentis* of Kant's Critique of Reason. "Whoever calculates, thinks." With these words he begins his Logic. The arithmetic of numerical relations in nature and history shows us that they have been reckoned, that they rest upon syllogisms, and therefore betray a subject which has thought them; but in the form of thinking as mere reckoning the vitality of the idea is destroyed, for, in order to be able to reckon, the moments of the idea must be reduced to dead *quantums*. Hence Hegel declares himself decidedly opposed

to that tendency in logic which would transmute thinking into reckoning, like Ploucquet's Calculus, &c., although he knows that reckoning without thinking at all is impossible. On the contrary, he took pains, in the third part of his *Logic*, especially at the beginning, and in the first chapter of the first division, to describe the dialectic nature of the idea. This is unquestionably one of the most difficult problems which he attempted to solve. Many readers have been frightened away from the Hegelian logic because they became giddy in this constant transition of opposite into opposite. They were accustomed to have general and special and individual nicely distinguished side by side, but now Hegel comes and shows them that (1) all three determinations are moments of one idea; (2) that just for that reason each of them contains both the others in itself; (3) that every moment is equal to every other in value, and that nevertheless they are found in subordination; (4) that therefore the conception of general, special, and individual, is distinguished, but that the perfect, true conception can be only the totality, the concrete unity of these distinctions. The general is also the special, for it distinguishes itself from itself, and it is this distinction which we call the special. But the general is also the individual, for without having it for a content the realization of the special into an existence independent in itself would be only a unit, not an individual. This individual is also thus itself again the general. Each moment of the total idea is, as determined, not what the others are, but at the same time as a moment of the whole no less *is* what they are.

Mathematicians do each other the justice, or at least the fairness, of admiring, in the work of others, even the elegance with which a problem is treated. From such a recognition philosophy is yet far removed. It allows the difficulties with which its presentation has to contend to be so little suspected, because it uses language accessible to all. The art with which Hegel has described the idea has been as yet but poorly estimated. We are wont to speak as if the "Hegelian idea" were something quite apart, which he construed in his *Logic*, while it really contains the objective thoughts which have absolutely nothing to do with the casual individuality of the thinker. The Hegelian idea is really the idea of idea, and no speculative idiosyncrasy.

RELATION OF THE LOGIC TO THE PHENOMENOLOGY.

Phenomenology was to constitute the *first part of the system of science*. In the first edition this title stood first. *Phenomenology of mind* was placed underneath, as designating the content of the first part.

In the preface as well as in the introduction to logic, Hegel mentioned expressly the Phenomenology and its relation to logic, especially that it should present the *arising* of the stand-point of absolute knowledge, in which the antithesis of subject and object has vanished, and from which, therefore, knowing should begin as pure science without antithesis. Within the perfected system, of course, phenomenology could not appear with that fulness with which at first it had absorbed the entire kingdoms of nature and mind into itself; for in the systematic totality this same content appears in a simple organic form, uninvolved in the struggle of consciousness to master its own essence in it. Phenomenology shows us how mind as consciousness, as individuality, as ethics, as right, as morality, as religion, as art, as science, stands related as opposed to nature, so far as it seeks to find the reality of its idea in these forms, until it arrives at absolute knowledge, as the absolute unity of the subject with the object, because the object has here become the absolute itself, in the absolute form itself of the idea. In the system of science phenomenology could, therefore, become only a moment of the sphere of the subjective mind, of ordinary so-called psychology. The stages, consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, were here the essentials.

Just before his death, Hegel began to revise the Phenomenology for a second edition, but he reached scarcely the middle of the preface. In its main features he left it much the same, but crossed out those passages which referred to the intended second part of the system. The suppression of these has been explained as if he had thereby retracted the original relation of the phenomenology as the mediation of the stand-point from which logic proceeds for thinking consciousness. This, however, does not follow; but merely that, since the publication of his system had taken place in another than the intended manner, the said announcement had lost its significance.

Hegel orally designated the *Phenomenology* in Berlin as the work in which he had made his "voyage of discovery." This expression can relate only to the concrete content of nature and history which he wrought over in it, and not to the general idea of consciousness, which also retained the same moments in the system of the philosophy of mind. Hegel conceded, however, by that expression, that he could have brought in a still more extended content into the *Phenomenology* than he did. When, later, he reduced the relation of the knowing subject to speculation (so far as concerns the beginning of speculative thinking), to the transition through skepticism, and to the simple resolution to will to think the truth absolutely, it must not be forgotten that no one would come to this resolve whose consciousness had not previously in some way completed in experience all its other content.

Hegel's division of consciousness remained (1) consciousness, (2) self-consciousness, (3) rational self-consciousness. To this, the following division of the *Logic* would correspond: (1) objective logic, (2) subjective logic, (3) absolute logic. The first would have contained the categories of being in general; the second, the moments of the idea; the third, the canon of the absolute idea. That Hegel confounded this trichotomy with another in the *Logic*—viz. being, essence, idea—is explained by the fact that he distinguished the idea of idea itself again into (1) the subjective, (2) the objective, (3) the idea. Hence one of the greatest difficulties of the *Logic* has arisen. We will here touch only upon the point adduced by criticism, that the same categories occur in the *Phenomenology* and in the *Logic*; so that the *Logic* was properly already contained in the *Phenomenology*.

This is quite right, but it cannot be otherwise. First, the content of *phenomenology*, as well as that of every other science, is formally ruled by logic. It cannot dispense with logical forms, which must therefore become manifest in its articulation. Second, the logical categories must themselves become objects of consciousness in concrete forms. Consciousness must, in the course of its culture, become master of the idea of logical forms. The existence of the logical in the concrete matter of consciousness cannot be excluded from its experience. Sensuous certainty, for example, cannot do otherwise

than make being, as definite being, its object. The senses make their appearance as the mediation of the certainty that something now and here looks red, tastes sweet, or feels smooth, &c.; but sense does not know that this something, as red, is distinguished from another, e.g. a green something. This knowing is an act of consciousness which distinguishes that excitation of the nerves of sight which we designate as red, from another as green. The animal does not attain this objectivization of its sensations, but rests in sensation. Red and green are distinguished even for the eye of the animal, but the animal cannot conclude *this is red*. It does not know that red is a different color from green. It knows nothing of *here and now*. It knows nothing of an individual object. It is, indeed, a self-feeling individualization, but knows not itself as subject in opposition to an object. It is consciousness which makes the sensuous an object, and thereby becomes certain of itself, i.e. knows being as distinct, as *this definite being*. Thus apprehension cannot perfect itself without the categories of the essential and the unessential, of the thing and its properties, &c.

THE ESSENTIAL AND THE UNESSENTIAL IN THE HEGELIAN METHOD.

The great problem which Hegel proposed in his *Logic*, centred itself about his conception of the dialectic method, which he regarded as the only true one. It consisted in the Platonic method, made profound by the method of Aristotle's metaphysics, and more accurately determined by the forms of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Subjectively it was to constitute the absolute organ of all genuine knowing, but objectively it was also to contain the immanent rhythm of ontological development which is immanent in reality. What Kant had distinguished on the one side as understanding, judgment, and reason, and on the other as idea, reflection, and syllogism, was to become united in the abstract, reflected, and speculative determinations of the logical idea. Its course was to be not merely analytic from the individual to the general, not merely synthetic from the general to the individual, but regressive and progressive at the same time, because the general unity was to distinguish itself from itself,

and only ultimately to be determined to its genuine concrete idea. In the treatment of the Phenomenology and of the Logic, Hegel himself gave an example of this method. He had made the idea expound itself, and thereby build itself up to a new idea. Idea as such is identical with itself, but through its differentiation it produces new ideas, and in that degree changes itself.

This must be rightly understood. The idea of a point, e.g., is always the same; but in so far as the point moves it begets another, the other of itself, in which it sublates itself as the true. The line again, by moving in different ways, produces the difference of straight and crooked. The point makes itself analytically a line, but synthetically it remains contained in it; the line makes itself analytically a straight or a crooked line, but synthetically it is posited as a line in the one as well as in the other. The soul of this dialectic was thus here, as with Plato and Aristotle, the negative of the idea, the antithesis which it brought forth out of itself. This is the incontrovertible truth of this process. Closely connected with this, however, is the unessential, so easily possible in its presentation, viz. error in regard to that which is posited as the negative. Hegel's thought strove toward the absolute independence of the idea from the philosopher. The part of the latter should be only that of looking on its movement. In the above illustration it is not I who make the point become a line; but it itself, by moving itself, produces itself as a line. I look upon this its self-formation. This highest ideal of all scientific investigation was not insured in its realization against the contingency of the philosopher, for here in the transition from the general to the special the distinction necessary in itself could very easily be varied, and the immanent antithesis be falsified. Even the abstract generality might be transposed with the concrete, the first with the last. Then, despite all claim of infallibility, the method fell into fallacious construction. In Hegel himself examples may be found where he is deluded and vacillating in this respect; e.g. in the Philosophy of Right, under the conception of the state power, he has set up royal sovereignty as the first, therefore abstract, moment; while in the second edition of the Encyclopedia it is the final and concrete moment.

Among the adherents of Hegel, the differences are still greater. Opponents of his philosophy receive these as proof of the falsity of his method, while the ground lies only in its uncritical use. Hegel wished manifestation of the idea, but the school often fell back to the mere construction of the philosophy of Schelling through precipitate and external application of the logical categories. That which can be called the unessential in Hegel's method has been especially evoked by the fact that the idea of antithesis became confounded with that of contradiction. Hegel took up the antinomy from Kant's dialectic with great satisfaction. While Kant placed contradiction only in our knowledge, Hegel said it should belong also to actuality itself. Contradiction, as real, is also possible, and can therefore become actual. It is not merely a phenomenon of our intelligence. Hegel now affirmed that, in the development of the idea, antinomies everywhere present themselves which must be solved into a higher unity. He did not intend to explain the contradiction as that which is true, for that which is true cannot contradict itself, but he discerned the foundation of all life, of all activity, in the fact that in the phenomenal world antithesis grew into contradiction, which latter manifested the unity in whose depth it sank away. The higher a particular being stands, and the more sides it has, so much the more easily can it involve itself in manifold contradictions. Hegel, therefore, took up contradiction as a constitutive moment into his system, and aroused endless contradiction thereby, because by this it was customary to understand the absurdity of something unthinkable, logically impossible. Contradiction is also antithesis; but antithesis as such, brought to the tension of negative actuality *versus* identity, is not contradiction, but in the world of phenomena it may every moment become contradiction. The antithesis of positive and negative electricity is in itself ever and everywhere present, but only in the thunderstorm does it become a contradiction which solves itself in lightning. Egoness, as individualization of mind, is immediately antithetical to its universality, but it becomes bad only when it negates it *in actu* and with consciousness. Physical selfishness is not yet ethical egotism. It cannot be

denied that Hegel's philosophy has not distinguished the contradictory, the contrary, and the repugnant, with sufficient care, and has caused confusion thereby; but still less can it be denied that the zeal which would again exile contradiction from philosophy without surmounting it, has resulted in the most lamentable shallowness.

The idea in-and-for-itself is, to be sure, without contradiction; but in its development, contradiction produces itself in the steps of transition. It must, therefore, always be measured on the higher. Eudemonism is the quite consequent issue of psychology. In itself there is nothing contradictory in being happy, in the satisfaction of one's instincts and appetites, but this principle leads to the contradiction of pleasure with itself, and this contradiction is solved not by psychology but by ethics. Man shall be more than happy—he shall be free.

When, therefore, Hegel is reproached with discerning truth in contradiction, an error is made; the contradiction which begets itself is in the same degree sublated; unity continues, not only negative but affirmative, through the totality of the development. The unity with which an idea begins is abstract identity; from this proceeds its difference; these station themselves over against one another in order to sublimate themselves into a higher unity. Thus backwards this is concrete, but forwards it manifests itself as a contradiction which sinks away in the depth of a higher unity opposed to it, which nevertheless in the beginning of its formation, or immediately, is only an abstract identity. The abstract in-and-for-itself is without contradiction, but the different steps of the phenomenal universe, re-interlinked with one another through contradiction (since it demands solution) into living unity.

That which is true, therefore, in the Hegelian method is the unrest of the negative, which makes its appearance in every sphere save that of the pure absolute. But this unrest is at the same time full of the repose which accrues to every moment of the whole as necessary and for itself positive. The higher step negates that which is presupposed and lower, and includes it in itself (as Hegel was wont to say) as its negative identity, but does not destroy it in its relative inde-

pendence. When, e.g., man as a microcosm comprehends the macrocosm of all nature compendiously in himself, the persistence of nature in itself is not destroyed.

The transition of one idea to another is no gradual metamorphosis as students of nature so readily seek to derive the origin of new forms by successive transformation of those already existing, but the existence of the higher grade is posited through the idea of the idea. The lower grade often reveals types in which the higher already has its analogy. It is the types which may deceive, but they are only the humorous prelude, not yet the thing itself; as the Rosaceæ envelope their kernel with the superfluity of a flesh which is yet no real, feeling flesh—as the ape seems to foreshadow the human form, yet is separated from man by an impassable gulf—as relief extends picture-like over surfaces, but is as yet no painting. Hegel could not call his method merely synthetic, because the higher step is the teleological ground of the lower; in its execution however, which he was not able himself to carry on to its completion—i.e. in the lectures published after his death—he has often, it is true, contented himself with a synthetic derivation. Here then, as with Spinoza, dogmatism entered, and in such a manner that presentation not infrequently sunk into that form which Hegel most abhorred in philosophy—to narration; in the school this increased still more—the trichotomies of the idea were decreed only in an assertorical manner. The discipline of thought, as Hegel had named the method, was quite thrown off to make way for the most motley anarchy.

THE ENCYCLOPEDIA.

It was natural that a mind which found itself upon so high a stand-point of scientific unity must approach the wish to live in a sphere adequate to itself. Hegel longed for academic activity. The favor of fortune came to him in various offers. He had already decided upon Heidelberg, when notice was also taken of him from Berlin.

There were especially two men, quite opposed to each other, who were instrumental in his appointment, Paulus and Daub. With the first he had stood in relations of personal friendship since Jena. With the latter he became

acquainted in Heidelberg, and through him was gradually alienated from Paulus, who observed the fact with great displeasure. Paulus was the most decided opponent of Romanticism, and could not pardon Hegel's sympathy for Daub and Creuzer, which he, in common with Voss, construed into a suspicion of crypto-catholicism. Hegel had never expressed himself publicly against Paulus, but Paulus persecuted him, when he was dead, in pamphlets and periodicals, and especially in a work which he entitled "*Geister revue*." He waged this polemic under the name "*Magis amica veritas*." Many bitter things which were retailed, ever more sarcastically, ever in wider circulation, owe their origin to their attacks under this pseudonym.

In Heidelberg, Hegel must have felt the necessity of giving to the public a presentation of his philosophy in its totality, for the Phenomenology of Mind had been a propædæutic work, and logic had been only the first part of his system. Both were, moreover, in a dialectic form so strict that they could have been understood only by the narrow circle of philosophers. Hegel's predecessor in Heidelberg had been Fries. With his totally different apprehension of speculation, it was necessary for Hegel to take pains to present in outline to the students the difference of his philosophy from that of Fries, at least in its chief moments. He proposed, therefore, a guide for his lectures which he named "Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences."

By the word Encyclopedia he wanted, as he himself said, to designate the unity of science, which composes a circle of circles. Beginning from itself, it widens itself to ever new determinations, which at the same time constitute deeper insights of the principle, until an ultimate stage is attained beyond which progress cannot be made, and with which knowing reverts into its beginning. Ever since Bacon, European science has striven toward totality. Since he had given to it only a psychological foundation in reason, memory, and phantasy, the unity remained external. The French Encyclopedia of Diderot and D'Alembert followed out, in the organization of sciences, essentially the plan of Bacon, but split up in execution into the atomistic multiplicity of the alphabetical article. In Germany, the division of the

Leibnitz-Wolff philosophy into theoretical and practical sciences had acquired validity and had been adopted by Kant, although he set up a higher division in the *Architectonique* of the *Critique of Pure Reason*; the physiology of pure reason, the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of ethics—or science of the idea of that which should be in general, of that which is, and of that which should be. This trichotomy Hegel elevated to the distinct grasp of the idea, (1) as logic, (2) as nature, (3) as mind. Every system since then, which, in the place of this simple articulation, would place another, has fallen. One very important step of Hegel was the presentation of natural philosophy. It should, consequently, have followed the *Logic* as an independent whole. Now it appears as an integral part of the total cycle of sciences, in an abbreviated form, which scarcely suffices to make clear the inner connection of nature with the idea as logic and as mind.

Still more scanty and difficult of understanding was the composition of the last part of the philosophy of mind. Its division into the idea of the subjective, objective, and absolute mind, was, to be sure, of convincing simplicity; but the presentation of absolute mind as art-religion, revealed religion, and philosophy, must at once awaken doubt. Why was art apprehended at the same time as religion? Why was religion, as revealed, distinguished from the idea of religion in general? Why was the absoluteness of knowledge placed only in philosophy, which, as human activity, is not yet free from ignorance, error, and doubt, i.e. is infected with problematic knowing? Why was it not plainly enunciated whether the absolute mind also exists in-and-for-itself as subject, or whether Hegel under this word had in view only art, religion, and science, within the phenomena of the human mind? In the enigmatical paragraphs, only one very scanty extract from the last chapter of the *Phenomenology* can be detected. We shall see later what weighty consequences are attached to this indistinctness.

As Hegel wished to give a clue for his lectures, he omitted the proper dialectic development, and gave only a list of definitions in which he had much practice in the notes for the philosophical propædeutics at the gymnasium, and had at-

tained great skill in using modes of expression. This form, moreover, has not been without influence upon the school, because it favored its dogmatism and abjured stricter philosophy. It is no exaggeration to affirm that, with the exception of Euclid, no text-book exists of such concentrated precision. Every word in this laconic language is freighted with meaning.

To logic, natural philosophy, and psychology, Hegel appended remarks in which he gave a trenchant criticism of those views which contradicted his own. In this way he skilfully incited to free reflection.

FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

Translated from the German of J. G. FICHTE, by A. E. KROEGER.

BOOK II.

FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN REGARD TO THE PRACTICAL FACULTY.

CHAPTER II.

The Tendency of the Ego to overcome the Check of the non-Ego is posited as a material Body.

A.—We have seen how the Ego, limited to a mere impulse and without any immediate causality, through its mere Being contemplated its power to arrive in time at an end through conditional states; calculating that power, at the same time, the resistance that was also contemplated in the image, and thus completing a plan of its causality. It appears immediately that it can fix this manifold of conditions and of time in no other unity-conception than the conception of itself, and that hence it must in this connection necessarily think itself here, moreover, as a real principle—and not merely, as in the previous book, as the principle of a reproduction through the power of imagination—and furthermore absolutely *à priori*, without any real causality having preceded, since the whole synthetical period starts from a complete annihilation of such causality.

Now that which offers the resistance is matter, and the purpose is to separate this matter, get it out of its place, or